On the Moral Considerability of Homo sapiens and Other Species. (1st February 2006)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Sandler, Ronald; Crane, Judith
• Is Part Of: Environmental values. Volume 15:Number 1(2006:Spring)
• Page Start: 69
• Page End: 84
• Publication Date: 2006-02-01
• Subjects: Environmental ethics -- Periodicals; Environmental policy -- Periodicals; 179.105
• DOI: 10.3197/096327106776678960
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0963-2719

Abstract

It is sometimes claimed that as members of the species Homo sapiens we have a responsibility to promote the good of Homo sapiens itself (distinct from the good of its individual members). Lawrence Johnson has recently defended this claim as part of his approach to resolving the problem of future generations. We show that there are several difficulties with Johnson's argument, many of which are likely to attend any attempt to establish the moral considerability of Homo sapiens or species generally. Further, even if Homo sapiens were morally considerable, this would not ground an adequate response to the problem of future generations. The sort of moral considerability that would be appropriate to Homo sapiens, or species generally, would not be as robust nor have the implications that many have supposed.