The Effect of Deadline Pressure on Pre‐Negotiation Positions: A Comparison of Auditors and Client Management1. (11th March 2015)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Bennett, G. Bradley; Hatfield, Richard C.; Stefaniak, Chad
• Is Part Of: Contemporary accounting research. Volume 32:Number 4(2015)
• Page Start: 1507
• Page End: 1528
• Publication Date: 2015-03-11
• Subjects: Auditors -- deadline pressure -- Negotiation -- Strategy; Accounting -- Research -- Periodicals; Accounting -- Canada -- Periodicals; 657
• DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12121
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0823-9150

Abstract

Abstract: This study compares auditors' and chief financial officers' pre‐negotiation judgments and considers the potential differential impact the end of the audit (deadline pressure) has on each party. General negotiation literature suggests that individuals change their behaviors as deadline pressure increases (i.e., when there is less time in which to conduct a negotiation) in order to increase the probability of reaching an agreement. In an audit context, the end‐of‐engagement deadline is often based on regulatory filing deadlines (e.g., SEC filings for public companies), which are not determined by either negotiating party. The audit context is also unique in that there are asymmetric consequences for each party (the auditor and client management) for failing to reach an agreement and different negotiation tactics used by the two parties potentially leading to differing levels of concessions. We predict that auditors, who are in a stronger negotiation position, will generally concede less than client management when determining their pre‐negotiation position and will tend to use more contentious strategies. However, such contentious strategies require time. Thus, we expect, based on negotiation theory, that as deadline pressure increases, auditors' concessionary behavior will be more affected than that of client management. Consistent with expectations, results of our experiment suggest that CFOs concede more than auditors in general; however, auditors are more reactive to deadline pressure and increase concessions when faced with high deadline pressure, while CFOs do not. We also measure planned strategy use and find results to be consistent with theory: when deadline pressure is high, auditors are less likely to use contentious tactics, while CFOs' strategy choices are unaffected by deadline pressure. These results suggest that characteristics of the unique auditor–client negotiation environment, such as deadline pressures, have potentially differential effects on both parties due to the differing negotiation strategies employed by these parties.