Identifying Organisms. (May 2017)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Napier, Stephen
• Is Part Of: Linacre quarterly. Volume 84:Number 2(2017)
• Page Start: 145
• Page End: 154
• Publication Date: 2017-05
• Subjects: Abortion -- Organisms -- Embryological development; Medical ethics -- Periodicals; Medicine -- Societies, etc -- Periodicals; 174.2
• DOI: 10.1080/00243639.2017.1306678
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0024-3639

Abstract

Defenders of human, embryonic, destructive stem-cell research and early abortion typically argue for their position by showing that you and I do not come into existence at conception but rather at some point after. Eugene Mills has provided an ingenious argument that you and I could not have come into existence at conception. I argue against Mills's argument on two counts: first, his argument depends upon a cursory limning of human conception, and when fuller details are considered, a premise in his argument is undercut. Second, Mills's argument invites us to ask questions about how to identify individual organisms. Given a fuller description of human conception and some plausible metaphysical principles, I argue that Mills should hold instead that you and I do in fact come into being at conception. Summary: One way to argue that early abortions are permissible is to argue against the view that you and I come into existence at conception. Most abortion rights defenders argue for this conclusion by noting that in order for you and I to exist, there must be developed psychological capacities. Eugene Mills takes a different route and argues that you and I could not come into existence at conception because that would mean being identical to an egg – which he rightly notes we cannot be. I argue against Mills in this article.