The Westminster Model and the "Indivisibility of the Political and Administrative Elite": A Convenient Myth Whose Time Is Up?. Issue 4 (25th July 2016)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Richards, David; Smith, Martin J.
• Is Part Of: Governance. Volume 29:Issue 4(2016)
• Page Start: 499
• Page End: 516
• Publication Date: 2016-07-25
• Subjects: Administrative agencies -- Periodicals; Civil service -- Periodicals; Public administration -- Periodicals; Policy sciences -- Periodicals; 350
• DOI: 10.1111/gove.12225
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0952-1895

Abstract

Abstract : This article argues that the principle of indivisibility in the relationship between political and administrative elites acted as a central convention of the Westminster system for much of the twentieth century. It explores how in more recent decades this principle has been challenged by the shift to a principal–agent approach. It considers the extent to which this shift diminishes the traditional Westminster model's understanding of the minister–civil servant relationship as one based on a symbiotic interdependent partnership. In its place has emerged a more universal command and control relationship that is seen as necessary to meet the demands of modern accountability and transparency. Such a change has fundamentally altered a long‐established power‐bargain between ministers and civil servants and undermined a core tenet of the Westminster model.