A Note on A. D. Taylor's Property of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives for Voting Rules. (December 2017)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Lahiri, Somdeb; Pattanaik, Prasanta K.
• Is Part Of: Studies in microeconomics. Volume 5:Number 2(2017:Dec.)
• Page Start: 99
• Page End: 104
• Publication Date: 2017-12
• Subjects: Voting rules -- Taylor's Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives -- Arrow's Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives -- anonymity -- neutrality -- Condorcet criterion -- Pareto criterion; Microeconomics -- Periodicals; 338.505
• DOI: 10.1177/2321022217711028
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 2321-0222

Abstract

Abstract: In a widely used textbook on mathematics and politics, Taylor introduced an interesting property of social choice procedures, which we call 'Taylor's Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (TIIA)'. Taylor proved a result showing that every voting procedure belonging to a certain class of voting procedures violates TIIA. The purpose of this note is to supplement Taylor's result by showing that a large number of voting rules, which do not belong to the class of voting procedures figuring in Taylor's result, also violate TIIA.