An incentive-based optimizing strategy of service frequency for an urban rail transit system. (October 2018)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Li, Changle; Ma, Jiao; Luan, Tom H.; Zhou, Xun; Xiong, Lei
• Is Part Of: Transportation research. Volume 118(2018)
• Page Start: 106
• Page End: 122
• Publication Date: 2018-10
• Subjects: Urban rail transit -- Service frequency -- Incentive strategy -- Stackelberg game; Logistics -- Periodicals; Transportation -- Periodicals; 388.011
• DOI: 10.1016/j.tre.2018.07.005
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1366-5545

Abstract

Highlights: Modeling the dynamic decision-making process of service frequency with game theory. Analyzing the temporal-spatial distribution characteristics of passengers' demand. Proposing an incentive strategy with consideration of the operator and passenger cost. Achieving a tradeoff between service quality and operating cost. Abstract: The service level of urban rail transit is very much affected by the service frequency. This paper proposes an optimizing strategy of service frequency to achieve a tradeoff between service quality and operating cost. Then, an incentive strategy is introduced into the optimizing process of service frequency, to motivate part of passengers to shift their trips from peak to off-peak periods, eventually mitigating the crowdedness and discomfort. Finally, numerical experiments based on a city's metro in China are performed and the results demonstrate that the proposed strategy can significantly improve the riding experience and decrease the operating cost.