Price and carbon emission decisions under pressures of consumer, regulator and competition. (2016)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Xiong, Yu; Yang, Jiaquan; Li, Yimeng
• Is Part Of: International journal of manufacturing technology and management. Volume 30:Number 1/2(2016)
• Page Start: 87
• Page End: 115
• Publication Date: 2016
• Subjects: consumer awareness -- environmental awareness -- carbon emissions -- carbon tax -- CO2 -- carbon dioxide -- environmental investment -- Stackelberg game -- pricing decisions -- consumer pressure -- regulator pressure -- competition pressure -- firm performance -- economic performance -- environmental performance -- supply chain management -- SCM -- emission reduction -- dual-channel supply chains; Manufacturing processes -- Periodicals; Manufacturing processes -- Automation -- Periodicals; Production management -- Periodicals; 670.427068
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1368-2148

Abstract

This paper examines the impacts of consumer environmental awareness, carbon emission tax and competition on the firms' economic and environmental performance. We find that both in the single-channel supply chain and dual-channel supply chain, the manufacturer in a 'clean' industry invests to reduce the amount of carbon emissions per unit of product produced actively; however, the manufacturer in a 'dirty' industry is expected to reject the environmental investment. The retailer is always better off with a higher consumer environmental awareness or a higher carbon emission tax in a 'clean' industry, but worse off in a 'dirty' industry. The manufacturer is better off with a higher consumer environmental awareness or a higher carbon emission tax if and only if she is in a 'dirty' industry and in the dual-channel supply chain. The numerical examples present the condition which secures Pareto gains after the manufacturer encroaches.