The revisionist's rubric: conceptual engineering and the discontinuity objection. Issue 8 (17th November 2018)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Prinzing, Michael
• Is Part Of: Inquiry. Volume 61:Issue 8(2018)
• Page Start: 854
• Page End: 880
• Publication Date: 2018-11-17
• Subjects: Conceptual engineering -- conceptual ethics -- concept change -- revision -- function; Philosophy -- Periodicals; Social sciences -- Philosophy -- Periodicals; Philosophy -- Periodicals; Social Sciences -- Periodicals; Electronic journals; Philosophie -- Périodiques; Sciences sociales -- Philosophie -- Périodiques; 105
• DOI: 10.1080/0020174X.2017.1385522
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0020-174X

Abstract

ABSTRACT: This paper is about conceptual engineering (CE). Specifically, it discusses a common objection to CE, which I call the Discontinuity Objection. According to the Discontinuity Objection, CE leads to problematic discontinuities in subject and/or inquiry – making it philosophically uninteresting or irrelevant. I argue that a conceptual engineer can dismiss the Discontinuity Objection by showing that the pre-engineering concept persists through the proposed changes. In other words, the Discontinuity Objection does not apply if the proposal involves identity-preserving changes. Two existing views on identity-preserving changes are considered and rejected. I then argue that an identity-preserving conceptual change is one that allows the concept to continue to perform its function. A concept's function is its job, its point and purpose, its role in a conceptual repertoire. In a slogan: Preserve a concept's function, and you preserve the concept itself; preserve the concept, and you preserve the subject. The paper concludes by discussing some implications of this view.