A demand response approach considering retailer incentive mechanism based on Stackelberg game in smart grid with multi retailers. (10th May 2018)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Dai, Yeming; Gao, Yan; Gao, Hongwei; Zhu, Hongbo
• Is Part Of: International transactions on electrical energy systems. Volume 28:Number 9(2018)
• Page Start: n/a
• Page End: n/a
• Publication Date: 2018-05-10
• Subjects: demand response -- incentive mechanism -- real‐time pricing -- Stackelberg game -- smart grid; Electric power -- Periodicals; Electric power systems -- Periodicals; Electrical engineering -- Periodicals; 621.3
• DOI: 10.1002/etep.2590
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 2050-7038

Abstract

Summary: As the key component of demand response management in smart grid, real‐time pricing has been an open issue to address. In this paper, a Stackelberg game with multiple power retailers and multiple users is proposed to maximize the revenue of each retailer and the payoff of each user in power retail market. The existence of Stackelberg equilibrium is analyzed and proved. A distributed algorithm is developed to ensure the convergence of Stackelberg equilibrium for retailers and users with only local information. Additionally, we design an incentive factor that adjusts the price information from retailers to guarantee the grid operation and assure supply‐demand balance since the smart grid still can be susceptible to the issues about privacy and security. The simulation results show the effectiveness of algorithm and the impact of incentive factor.