Knowledge, Safety, and Meta‐Epistemic Belief. (7th June 2018)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Ross, Jacob
• Is Part Of: Pacific philosophical quarterly. Volume 99:Number 3(2018)
• Page Start: 550
• Page End: 554
• Publication Date: 2018-06-07
• Subjects: Philosophy -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1111/papq.12205
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0279-0750

Abstract

Abstract: This article raises problems both for the view that safe belief is necessary for knowledge and for the view that it is sufficient. Focusing on 'meta‐epistemic beliefs, ' or beliefs about the epistemic status of one's own beliefs, it is shown that the necessity claim has counterintuitive implications and that the sufficiency claim implies a contradiction. It is then shown that meta‐epistemic beliefs raise similar problems for a wide range of accounts of knowledge, and hence that they provide a powerful test for theories of knowledge.