A game theory perspective of asymmetric alliances for new product development. (10th April 2015)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Chou, P. Ben; Thomas, Ellen
• Is Part Of: International journal of entrepreneurship and innovation management. Volume 19:Number 1/2(2015)
• Page Start: 99
• Page End: 116
• Publication Date: 2015-04-10
• Subjects: game theory -- link alliances -- Nash equilibrium -- new product development -- NPD -- R&#38 -- D -- scale alliances -- strategic alliances -- asymmetric alliances -- research and development -- benefits; Entrepreneurship -- Periodicals; 338.0405
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1368-275X

Abstract

By adopting and extending the game theoretical model developed by Chou (2011) from symmetric firms to asymmetric firms with monetary transfers, we characterise the strategic interactions between asymmetric firms in an alliance for new product development. We also integrate the game theoretical literature and empirical studies to show that a broader–scope link alliance tends to benefit the larger firm, while a narrower–scope scale alliance tends to benefit the smaller firm. The asymmetry of benefits also enables the larger firm to subsidise the smaller firm to maintain the stability of the alliance if it is beneficial for the larger firm to do so.