Emotion, deliberation, and the skill model of virtuous agency. (1st May 2018)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Kurth, Charlie
• Is Part Of: Mind & language. Volume 33:Number 3(2018:Jun.)
• Page Start: 299
• Page End: 317
• Publication Date: 2018-05-01
• Subjects: agency -- anxiety -- deliberation -- emotion -- metacognition -- virtue; Psycholinguistics -- Periodicals; Thought and thinking -- Periodicals; Language and languages -- Philosophy -- Periodicals; 153.42
• DOI: 10.1111/mila.12186
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0268-1064

Abstract

Abstract : A recent skeptical challenge denies deliberation is essential to virtuous agency: what looks like genuine deliberation is just a post hoc rationalization of a decision already made by automatic mechanisms. Julia Annas's account of virtue seems well‐equipped to respond: by modeling virtue on skills, she can agree that virtuous actions are deliberation‐free while insisting that their development requires significant thought. But Annas's proposal is flawed: it over‐intellectualizes deliberation's developmental role and under‐intellectualizes its significance once virtue is acquired. Doing better requires paying attention to a distinctive form of anxiety—one that functions to engage deliberation in the face of decisions that automatic mechanisms alone cannot resolve.