The curious case of the self-refuting straw man: Trafimow and Earp's response to Klein. (August 2016)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Klein, Stanley B.
• Is Part Of: Theory & psychology. Volume 26:Number 4(2016:Aug.)
• Page Start: 549
• Page End: 556
• Publication Date: 2016-08
• Subjects: history of science -- nature of theory -- philosophy of science; Psychology -- Periodicals; 150.1
• DOI: 10.1177/0959354316648230
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0959-3543

Abstract

In their critique of Klein (2014b), Trafimow and Earp present two theses. First, they argue that, contra Klein, a well-specified theory is not a necessary condition for successful replication. Second, they contend that even when there is a well-specified theory, replication depends more on auxiliary assumptions than on theory proper. I take issue with both claims, arguing that (a) their first thesis confuses a material conditional (what I said) with a modal claim (Trafimow and Earp's misreading of what I said) and (b) their second thesis has the unfortunate consequence of refuting their first thesis.