When War Helps Civil–military Relations: Prolonged Interstate Conflict and the Reduced Risk of Coups. (December 2016)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Piplani, Varun; Talmadge, Caitlin
• Is Part Of: Journal of conflict resolution. Volume 60:Number 8(2016)
• Page Start: 1368
• Page End: 1394
• Publication Date: 2016-12
• Subjects: conflict -- domestic politics -- international security -- interstate conflict -- militarized interstate disputes -- war -- political survival -- use of force; War and society -- Periodicals; Peace -- Periodicals; Arbitration (International law) -- Periodicals; 327.16
• DOI: 10.1177/0022002714567950
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0022-0027

Abstract

Coups remain a widespread and consequential political phenomenon, but it remains unclear whether interstate conflict protects leaders from the risk of coups or increases this risk. We theorize that interstate conflict—especially when it is prolonged—should protect domestic regimes from military overthrow by foreclosing many of the key pathways by which elites plot and execute coups. We test this argument using event history modeling. The evidence provides support for our claim that coup risk declines in the presence of enduring interstate conflict. Just as important, we detect no evidence that war increases coup risk.