Holding the European Commission to account: the promise of delegated acts. (December 2016)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Brandsma, Gijs Jan
• Is Part Of: International review of administrative sciences. Volume 82:Number 4(2016:Dec.)
• Page Start: 656
• Page End: 673
• Publication Date: 2016-12
• Subjects: accountability -- delegation -- European Parliament -- European Union; Public administration -- Periodicals; Comparative government -- Periodicals; 320
• DOI: 10.1177/0020852315583195
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0020-8523

Abstract

This article focuses on a new type of rules that the European Union may adopt: delegated legislation. Although this instrument may be new, it follows from a long-standing controversy over the means by which the European Parliament can hold the European Commission to account when it adopts executive rules. On the basis of interviews and documentary evidence, this article aims to test to what degree the new system delivers on its promise of stronger accountability. Although the new system is still in its infancy, the article concludes that formal rules, internal norms and practices are already indicative of stronger legislative control. However, capacity issues within the European Parliament, as well as a lack of public transparency, may well prove to be detrimental when the number of delegated acts increases. Points for practitioners: This article assesses the degree to which the European Parliament is equipped to hold the European Commission to account when it adopts delegated legislation. Current accountability systems and practices are still in their infancy, but there are already clear signs of stronger legislative control over the European Commission. However, capacity issues within the European Parliament and a lack of transparency of delegated legislation will jeopardize accountability as the number of delegated acts increases.