Revisiting a Signaling Game of Legislative–Judiciary Interaction. (2016)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Park, Hong Min
• Is Part Of: Political analysis. Volume 24:Number 4(2016:Winter)
• Page Start: 501
• Page End: 504
• Publication Date: 2016
• Subjects: Political science -- Methodology -- Periodicals; Electronic journals; 320.011
• DOI: 10.1093/pan/mpw023
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1047-1987

Abstract

Abstract : By adding an informational component to the judicial review, Rogers (2001) argued that an independent court can be created and maintained by a legislature. This influential article, however, has one important mistake in its game-theoretical model that changes the equilibrium results and ultimately undermines the theoretical contribution to the discipline. The legislature no longer enjoys informational benefits by having an independent court.