Watchdogs in Our Midst: How Presidents Monitor Coalitions in Brazil's Multiparty Presidential Regime. (2nd January 2018)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Pereira, Carlos; Batista, Mariana; Praça, Sérgio; Lopez, Felix
• Is Part Of: Latin American politics and society. Volume 59:Number 3(2017:Autumn)
• Page Start: 27
• Page End: 47
• Publication Date: 2018-01-02
• Subjects: Latin America -- Periodicals; Amérique latine -- Périodiques; Sociale ontwikkeling; Politieke ontwikkeling; 980
• DOI: 10.1111/laps.12025
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1531-426X

Abstract

Abstract: When delegating governing tasks to a coalition partner, the president would like to give a minister ample administrative powers to be able to effectively accomplish the political mission. Due to information asymmetries, the president runs the risk that this discretion might be used to pursue policy outcomes that may harm the president's preferences. This trade-off between delegation and control is key to understanding governance strategies the president chooses to minimize agency risks and coordinate public policies. With Brazil as a case study, this article demonstrates that presidents have strategically made frequent use of junior ministers as watch-dogs of coalition partners, especially when coalition allies are ideologically distant from the president's preferences. Yet neither the portfolio salience nor the president's decision to share powers with coalition partners proportionally seems to interfere in such strategic decisions.