Proving that the Mind Is Not a Machine?. (10th April 2018)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Stern, Johannes
• Is Part Of: Thought. Volume 7:Number 2(2018:Jun.)
• Page Start: 81
• Page End: 90
• Publication Date: 2018-04-10
• Subjects: Gödel's disjunction -- Gödelian arguments against mechanism -- intensional paradox -- theories of truth -- mechanism -- incompleteness theorems; Philosophy -- Periodicals; Logic -- Periodicals; Knowledge, Theory of -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1002/tht3.271
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 2161-2234

Abstract

Abstract : This piece continues the tradition of arguments by John Lucas, Roger Penrose and others to the effect that the human mind is not a machine. Kurt Gödel thought that the intensional paradoxes stand in the way of proving that the mind is not a machine. According to Gödel, a successful proof that the mind is not a machine would require a solution to the intensional paradoxes. We provide what might seem to be a partial vindication of Gödel and show that if a particular solution to the intensional paradoxes is adopted, one can indeed give an argument to the effect that the mind is not a machine.