You meta believe it. (24th March 2018)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Levy, Neil
• Is Part Of: European journal of philosophy. Volume 26:Number 2(2018)
• Page Start: 814
• Page End: 826
• Publication Date: 2018-03-24
• Subjects: Philosophy -- Periodicals; Philosophy, European -- Periodicals; Philosophy, Modern -- 20th century -- Periodicals; 190
• DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12344
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0966-8373

Abstract

Abstract: Because of the privileged place of beliefs in explaining behaviour, mismatch cases—in which agents sincerely claim to believe that p, but act in a way that is inconsistent with that belief—have attracted a great deal of attention. In this paper, I argue that some of these cases, at least, are at least partially explained by agents believing that they believe that p, while failing to believe that p . Agents in these cases do not believe that ~ p ; rather, they have an indistinct first‐order, beliefy, representation that p . The indistinctness of this first‐order representation provides the leeway for the inconsistency seen in their behaviour.