What is (Dis)Agreement?. (15th December 2016)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Rowbottom, Darrell P.
• Is Part Of: Philosophy and phenomenological research. Volume 97:Number 1(2018)
• Page Start: 223
• Page End: 236
• Publication Date: 2016-12-15
• Subjects: Philosophy -- Periodicals; Phenomenology -- Periodicals; 100
• DOI: 10.1111/phpr.12354
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0031-8205

Abstract

Abstract : When do we agree? The answer might once have seemed simple and obvious; we agree that p when we each believe that p . But from a formal epistemological perspective, where degrees of belief are more fundamental than beliefs, this answer is unsatisfactory. On the one hand, there is reason to suppose that it is false; degrees of belief about p might differ when beliefs simpliciter on p do not. On the other hand, even if it is true, it is too vague; for what it is to believe simpliciter ought to be explained in terms of degrees of belief. This paper presents several possible notions of agreement, and corresponding notions of disagreement. It indicates how the findings are fruitful for the epistemology of disagreement, with special reference to the notion of epistemic peerhood.