Can Only Human Lives Be Meaningful?. (4th May 2018)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Thomas, Joshua Lewis
• Is Part Of: Philosophical papers. Volume 47:Number 2(2018)
• Page Start: 265
• Page End: 297
• Publication Date: 2018-05-04
• Subjects: Philosophy -- Periodicals; Philosophy, African -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2017.1422793
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0556-8641

Abstract

Abstract: Duncan Purves and Nicolas Delon have argued that one's life will be meaningful to the extent that one contributes to valuable states of affairs and this contribution is a result of one's intentional actions. They then argue, contrary to some theorists' intuitions, that non-human animals are capable of fulfilling these requirements, and that this finding might entail important things for the animal ethics movement. In this paper, I also argue that things besides human beings can have meaningful existences, but I disagree with Purves and Delon's theory of meaning, and some of the practical implications they suggest arise from their conclusion. Specifically, I argue that Purves and Delon are wrong to suggest that intentional agency is necessary for one's life to be meaningful; contributing to valuable states of affairs can be sufficient by itself. Purves and Delon's objection to such a claim is that it would allow even inanimate objects' existences to count as meaningful. However, while I accept this consequence, I argue that it only seems counterintuitive because of two false beliefs they appear to hold: that some X cannot have a meaningful existence without that meaning (a) making X better off or (b) giving X reasons for pride.