Popper's Theory of World 3 and the Evolution of the Internet. (June 2016)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Backes, Peter
• Other Names: Neck Reinhard guest-editor.; Miller David guest-editor.; Birner Jack guest-editor.
• Is Part Of: Philosophy of the social sciences. Volume 46:Number 3(2016:Jul.)
• Page Start: 265
• Page End: 287
• Publication Date: 2016-06
• Subjects: technological singularity -- world 3 -- constructive Aristotelianism -- Grundlagenstreit -- computers -- Internet -- meaning of life; Social sciences -- Periodicals; Social sciences -- Methodology -- Periodicals; Sciences sociales -- Périodiques; Sciences sociales -- Méthodologie -- Périodiques; 300.1
• DOI: 10.1177/0048393116641332
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0048-3931

Abstract

While developing his theory of world 3, Popper rejects two claims made by Plato: first, that the inhabitants of world 3, ideas, are a source of ultimate explanation, a divine revelation of truth, and second, that these ideas are unchanging. I will rehabilitate the second claim. Man does not construct world 3 by creating his theories (as Popper claims), nor is it a source of ultimate truth (as Plato claims). Instead, world 3 is discovered by man, and it destroys some of his theories: destructive Platonism. I discuss the impact of the modified position on the Grundlagenstreit in mathematics, taking into account Gillies's constructive Aristotelianism. I then turn to the philosophy of computers and discuss how destructive Platonism relates to computers and the Internet. In particular, I criticize Popper's claim that computers are nothing but elaborate pens as too pessimistic and incautious, and the fashionable "singularity" theory (von Neumann, Ulam, Vinge, Kurzwell, Hawking) as too optimistic and at the same time too fatalistic. In my closing remarks, as an antidote against both views, I provide a more modest and reasonable (although, of course, very wild) speculation about the ultimate goal and meaning of life.