Divided Government and Delay in the Legislative Process: Evidence From Important Bills, 1949-2010. (September 2015)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Hughes, Tyler; Carlson, Deven
• Is Part Of: American politics research. Volume 43:Number 5(2015:Sep.)
• Page Start: 771
• Page End: 792
• Publication Date: 2015-09
• Subjects: Congress -- divided government -- delay -- polarization -- legislative process; Public opinion -- United States -- Periodicals; United States -- Politics and government -- Periodicals; 320.973
• DOI: 10.1177/1532673X15574594
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1532-673X

Abstract

Despite a robust history of studies examining legislative outputs, little is known about how divided government affects the policymaking process. This article examines these dynamics by analyzing the relationship between divided government and delay in the consideration of important legislation. We also introduce a more nuanced measure of divided government—the strength of the president's party in Congress—that measures both the presence and magnitude of inter-branch conflict. Using a Cox proportional hazards model to analyze delay of important legislation from 1949 to 2010, the results indicate both divided government and the strength of the president's party in Congress are significantly related to legislative delay. Moreover, presidential party strength significantly interacts with partisan polarization. When the parties are moderately or highly polarized, there is a significant relationship between the strength of the president's party and legislative delay; this relationship is insignificant at lower levels of polarization. Taken together, these findings enhance our understanding of how inter-branch conflict affects the policymaking process in Congress.