Passive non-participation versus strategic defection in a collective risk social dilemma. (January 2016)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Bynum, Autumn; Kline, Reuben; Smirnov, Oleg
• Other Names: Coleman Eric A guest-editor.; Wilson Rick K guest-editor.
• Is Part Of: Journal of theoretical politics. Volume 28:Number 1(2016:Jan.)
• Page Start: 138
• Page End: 158
• Publication Date: 2016-01
• Subjects: Collective risk -- cooperation -- participation -- public goods game -- social dilemma; Political science -- Periodicals; 320
• DOI: 10.1177/0951629815586880
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0951-6298

Abstract

Empirical evidence suggests that non-participation underlies a variety of social dilemmas. In collective risk social dilemmas (CRSD), non-participation is viewed as strategic defection—a selfish behavior that increases individual utility at the cost of the group. We conducted a hybrid laboratory-then-online experiment to examine if non-participation in a CRSD may be fundamentally different from the act of strategic defection. We confirmed that non-participation is a problem in a social dilemma. When participation is required, a randomly formed group of subjects was virtually certain to reach the loss prevention threshold (0.999 probability). On the other hand, when an empirically realistic non-participation option was introduced, the probability of reaching the goal by a randomly formed group decreased to 0.599. We also found evidence that the profile of a typical non-participant does not fit the profile of a strategic defector. Non-participants in the experiment were highly cooperative when they had to make a contribution decision. Non-participants in the experiment did not try to increase their payoffs, including in the treatment condition when non-participation led to a default contribution of 100% of the subject's endowment.