Curing the Mischiefs of Faction in the American Administrative State. (January 2016)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Cook, Brian J.
• Is Part Of: American review of public administration. Volume 46:Number 1(2016:Jan.)
• Page Start: 3
• Page End: 27
• Publication Date: 2016-01
• Subjects: special interests -- administrative power -- constitutional redesign; Public administration -- Periodicals; Public administration -- United States -- Periodicals; 351
• DOI: 10.1177/0275074015612160
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0275-0740

Abstract

The worries American citizens express about the distorting influence of minority factions, or special interests, on public governance are as old as the republic. I briefly recount the constitutional design flaws and developmental changes that have combined to make these worries more valid than ever in an age of administratively centered governance. I then review the evidence on the nature and extent of special interest influence on the administrative process from a broad swath of scholarship. After noting the limited efficacy of attempts to limit special interest influence via minor tinkering with the separation of powers, I argue for more fundamental structural change in the form of administration as a separate, constitutionally recognized element of the separation of powers. I outline basic structural features and offer hypothetical yet plausible consequences of such a design change. The latter, I contend, are amenable to confirmation or refutation through systematic analysis of evidence that is already available from past and current governing experience.