Disconfirming Moral Foundations Theory on Its Own Terms: Reply to Graham (2015). (November 2015)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Gray, Kurt; Keeney, Jonathan E.
• Is Part Of: Social psychological & personality science. Volume 6:Number 8(2015:Nov.)
• Page Start: 874
• Page End: 877
• Publication Date: 2015-11
• Subjects: justice -- morality -- social cognition -- values -- ethics/morality; Personality -- Periodicals; Social psychology -- Periodicals; Electronic journals; 155.2
• DOI: 10.1177/1948550615592243
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1948-5506

Abstract

People see immorality in sin and sex, but is "purity" a unique type of moral content, with unique cognition? Domain-general accounts—and parsimony—suggest that all moral content is processed similarly and that "purity" is merely a descriptive label. Conversely, domain-specific theories (e.g., moral foundations theory [MFT]) argue for a special purity module. Consistent with domain-general accounts, we demonstrated that purity concerns are not distinguished from harm concerns—in either MFT or naturalistic scenarios—and that controlling for domain-general dimensions eliminates effects previously ascribed to moral "modules." Here, we reaffirm the strength of our data, exploring how issues raised by Graham reflect only weaknesses in MFT. Importantly, we identify several clear contradictions between Graham's comment and past-published accounts of MFT. To the extent that MFT stands by its published stimuli, methodologies, and theoretical assumptions, we believe that we have disconfirmed MFT on its own terms.