The Paradox of Misaligned Profiling: Theory and Experimental Evidence. (April 2016)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Holt, Charles A.; Kydd, Andrew; Razzolini, Laura; Sheremeta, Roman
• Is Part Of: Journal of conflict resolution. Volume 60:Number 3(2016)
• Page Start: 482
• Page End: 500
• Publication Date: 2016-04
• Subjects: terrorism -- profiling -- game theory -- laboratory experiment; War and society -- Periodicals; Peace -- Periodicals; Arbitration (International law) -- Periodicals; 327.16
• DOI: 10.1177/0022002714545223
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0022-0027

Abstract

This article implements an experimental test of a game-theoretic model of equilibrium profiling. Attackers choose a demographic "type" from which to recruit, and defenders choose which demographic types to search. Some types are more reliable than others in the sense of having a higher probability of carrying out a successful attack if they get past the security checkpoint. In a Nash equilibrium, defenders tend to profile by searching the more reliable attacker types more frequently, whereas the attackers tend to send less reliable types. Data from laboratory experiments with financially motivated human subjects are consistent with the qualitative patterns predicted by theory. However, we also find several interesting behavioral deviations from the theory.