Resolving Peer Disagreements Through Imprecise Probabilities. (21st May 2016)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Elkin, Lee; Wheeler, Gregory
• Is Part Of: Noûs. Volume 52:Number 2(2018:Jun.)
• Page Start: 260
• Page End: 278
• Publication Date: 2016-05-21
• Subjects: Philosophy -- Periodicals; 100
• DOI: 10.1111/nous.12143
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0029-4624

Abstract

Abstract: Two compelling principles, the Reasonable Range Principle and the Preservation of Irrelevant Evidence Principle, are necessary conditions that any response to peer disagreements ought to abide by. The Reasonable Range Principle maintains that a resolution to a peer disagreement should not fall outside the range of views expressed by the peers in their dispute, whereas the Preservation of Irrelevant Evidence (PIE) Principle maintains that a resolution strategy should be able to preserve unanimous judgments of evidential irrelevance among the peers. No standard Bayesian resolution strategy satisfies the PIE Principle, however, and we give a loss aversion argument in support of PIE and against Bayes. The theory of imprecise probability allows one to satisfy both principles, and we introduce the notion of a set‐based credal judgment to frame and address a range of subtle issues that arise in peer disagreements.