If an ontologist could speak we couldn't understand him. Issue 4 (19th May 2018)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Hewitt, Simon
• Is Part Of: Inquiry. Volume 61:Issue 4(2018)
• Page Start: 444
• Page End: 460
• Publication Date: 2018-05-19
• Subjects: Ontology -- meta-ontology -- quine -- fundamentality -- existence -- quantifiers; Philosophy -- Periodicals; Social sciences -- Philosophy -- Periodicals; Philosophy -- Periodicals; Social Sciences -- Periodicals; Electronic journals; Philosophie -- Périodiques; Sciences sociales -- Philosophie -- Périodiques; 105
• DOI: 10.1080/0020174X.2017.1405842
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0020-174X

Abstract

Abstract: It is common for contemporary ontologists to claim that they are not concerned with what exists simpliciter, but rather with what exists 'fundamentally', or what 'really' exists. I argue that positions of this sort cannot satisfy reasonable constraints concerning the acquisition of language. I assess and dismiss possible responses to this complaint before commenting on the prospects for a metaphysics without bespoke existence claims.