A sound Cartesian Argument from Doubt for dualism. Issue 4 (19th May 2018)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Maunu, Ari
• Is Part Of: Inquiry. Volume 61:Issue 4(2018)
• Page Start: 461
• Page End: 465
• Publication Date: 2018-05-19
• Subjects: Dualism -- Descartes -- intensionality -- de re; Philosophy -- Periodicals; Social sciences -- Philosophy -- Periodicals; Philosophy -- Periodicals; Social Sciences -- Periodicals; Electronic journals; Philosophie -- Périodiques; Sciences sociales -- Philosophie -- Périodiques; 105
• DOI: 10.1080/0020174X.2016.1210020
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0020-174X

Abstract

Abstract: I put forward a version of the Cartesian Argument from Doubt for mind–body dualism. My version utilizes de re statements, which means that it is not vulnerable to the usual charge of intensional fallacy. The key de re statement is, 'Body is such that its existence is entailed by Mind's believing that Body does not exist', which is false, whereas the respective 'Mind is such that its existence is entailed by Mind's believing that Body does not exist' is true.