A game-theoretic model for co-promotions: Choosing a complementary versus an independent product ally. (July 2015)
- Record Type:
- Journal Article
- Title:
- A game-theoretic model for co-promotions: Choosing a complementary versus an independent product ally. (July 2015)
- Main Title:
- A game-theoretic model for co-promotions: Choosing a complementary versus an independent product ally
- Authors:
- Karray, Salma
Sigué, Simon Pierre - Abstract:
- Abstract: This paper studies the optimal choice of promotional partners in a three-firm market where two firms sell complementary products and a third firm sells an independent product. Game-theoretic models are developed to investigate the following scenarios: no promotional partnership, partnership between the two complementary products, partnership between a complementary product and the independent product, and partnership between the three products. Equilibrium Nash solutions are obtained and conditions under which each of the four scenarios above can be implemented are identified. Results show that these conditions depend on various parameters, mainly the degree of product complementarity, the effectiveness of individual promotion, the effectiveness of joint promotion, and the base demand for each product. Commonly, a partnership between a complementary product and the independent product is optimal when the price effect of the complementary product is large, while the partnership between the two complementary products is more appealing when the effect of individual promotion is large enough. When feasible, a promotional partnership between the three products is preferred, except in some specified conditions. Highlights: We model joint promotions between complementary and independent products. An independent partner is preferred when the price complementary effect is large. A complementary partner is preferred when individual promotions are very effective. AAbstract: This paper studies the optimal choice of promotional partners in a three-firm market where two firms sell complementary products and a third firm sells an independent product. Game-theoretic models are developed to investigate the following scenarios: no promotional partnership, partnership between the two complementary products, partnership between a complementary product and the independent product, and partnership between the three products. Equilibrium Nash solutions are obtained and conditions under which each of the four scenarios above can be implemented are identified. Results show that these conditions depend on various parameters, mainly the degree of product complementarity, the effectiveness of individual promotion, the effectiveness of joint promotion, and the base demand for each product. Commonly, a partnership between a complementary product and the independent product is optimal when the price effect of the complementary product is large, while the partnership between the two complementary products is more appealing when the effect of individual promotion is large enough. When feasible, a promotional partnership between the three products is preferred, except in some specified conditions. Highlights: We model joint promotions between complementary and independent products. An independent partner is preferred when the price complementary effect is large. A complementary partner is preferred when individual promotions are very effective. A promotional partnership between the three products is preferred in most cases. … (more)
- Is Part Of:
- Omega. Volume 54(2015:Jul.)
- Journal:
- Omega
- Issue:
- Volume 54(2015:Jul.)
- Issue Display:
- Volume 54 (2015)
- Year:
- 2015
- Volume:
- 54
- Issue Sort Value:
- 2015-0054-0000-0000
- Page Start:
- 84
- Page End:
- 100
- Publication Date:
- 2015-07
- Subjects:
- Promotional alliance -- Complementary product -- Joint promotion -- Independent product -- Game theory -- Marketing–OR interface
Management -- Periodicals
658.4005 - Journal URLs:
- http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/latest/03050483 ↗
http://www.elsevier.com/journals ↗ - DOI:
- 10.1016/j.omega.2015.01.008 ↗
- Languages:
- English
- ISSNs:
- 0305-0483
- Deposit Type:
- Legaldeposit
- View Content:
- Available online (eLD content is only available in our Reading Rooms) ↗
- Physical Locations:
- British Library DSC - 6256.426000
British Library DSC - BLDSS-3PM
British Library HMNTS - ELD Digital store - Ingest File:
- 6365.xml