Are our moral responsibility practices justified? Wittgenstein, Strawson and justification in 'Freedom and Resentment'. Issue 3 (4th May 2018)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: De Mesel, Benjamin
• Is Part Of: British journal for the history of philosophy. Volume 26:Issue 3(2018)
• Page Start: 603
• Page End: 614
• Publication Date: 2018-05-04
• Subjects: P. F. Strawson -- transcendental argument -- moral responsibility -- Wittgenstein -- justification; Philosophy -- History -- Periodicals; 109
• DOI: 10.1080/09608788.2017.1420628
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0960-8788

Abstract

ABSTRACT: D. Justin Coates argues that, in 'Freedom and Resentment', P. F. Strawson develops a modest transcendental argument for the legitimacy of our moral responsibility practices. I disagree with Coates' claim that Strawson's argument provides a justification, in Wittgenstein's and/or Strawson's sense of that term, of our responsibility practices. I argue that my interpretation of Strawson solves some difficulties with Coates' argument, while retaining its advantages.