Decentralization or integration: Distribution channel selection under environmental taxation. (May 2018)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Bian, Junsong; Guo, Xiaolei; Li, Kevin W.
• Is Part Of: Transportation research. Volume 113(2018)
• Page Start: 170
• Page End: 193
• Publication Date: 2018-05
• Subjects: Channel selection -- Environmental tax -- Supply chain management -- Game theory; Logistics -- Periodicals; Transportation -- Periodicals; 388.011
• DOI: 10.1016/j.tre.2017.09.011
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1366-5545

Abstract

Highlights: We study manufacturers' distribution channel strategies under environmental taxation. We find that the environmental tax gets less stringent when the distribution channel structure becomes more decentralized. A monopolistic manufacturer benefits from decentralization when its technology is sufficiently polluting. Two competing manufacturers are more likely to decentralize in equilibrium when their technologies are more polluting. Abstract: This study reveals that the environmental tax gets less stringent when the manufacturer's distribution channel becomes more decentralized. Contrary to the classic double marginalization problem, the first implication is that a monopolistic manufacturer benefits from decentralization when its technology is sufficiently polluting. Secondly, with two competing manufacturers, both are more likely to decentralize in equilibrium when their technologies are more polluting. Under certain conditions, decentralized manufacturers may enjoy higher profits thanks to tax cuts without affecting social welfare or consumer surplus. Various extensions of the base models confirm the robustness of the analytical results.