Evolutionarily Stable Strategies in Sports Contests. (January 2015)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Grossmann, Martin
• Is Part Of: Journal of sports economics. Volume 16:Number 1(2015:Jan.)
• Page Start: 108
• Page End: 121
• Publication Date: 2015-01
• Subjects: contest -- evolutionary stable strategies -- utility maximization -- team sports league; Sports -- Economic aspects -- Periodicals; Sports administration -- Periodicals; 338.47796
• DOI: 10.1177/1527002512470957
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1527-0025

Abstract

Most articles on sports economics presume the well-known Nash equilibrium concept. In this article, however, we apply evolutionary game theory in a sports-contest model. If clubs follow evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS), then ESS generate greater investments and smaller profits than predicted by Nash's strategies, independent of whether a club is win-maximizing or profit-maximizing. Overdissipation of the rent is possible for Nash strategies and for ESS.