Does Political Activism and Affiliation Affect Allocation of Benefits in the Rural Employment Guarantee Program: Evidence from West Bengal, India. (March 2015)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Das, Upasak
• Is Part Of: World development. Volume 67(2015)
• Page Start: 202
• Page End: 217
• Publication Date: 2015-03
• Subjects: political activity -- political clientelism -- MGNREGA -- West Bengal -- India; Economic history -- 1990- -- Periodicals; Economic assistance -- Developing countries -- Periodicals; 330.9
• DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2014.10.009
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0305-750X

Abstract

Highlights: We study the rural employment guarantee program implemented in India from 2005. Data from a primary survey conducted in some villages of West Bengal is used. Households affiliated to ruling party enjoy more benefits from the program. Politically active households also enjoy such benefits more than the inactive ones. Need for awareness generation and reduction in rationing for better implementation. Summary: The paper investigates prevalence of political clientelism in allocation of benefits under the rural employment guarantee program, currently implemented in India. Using survey data collected from some villages of West Bengal, it is found that households, which are politically active and supporters of the local ruling political party, are more likely to receive the benefits in terms of participation, number of days of work and earnings from the program. Qualitative evidence corroborates the findings. The study shows predominance of political favoritism under the program and lays emphasis on reducing rationing and enhancing awareness of the entitlements to curb this practice.