Power Politics or Public Pandering? An Empirical Investigation of Economic Sanctions and Presidential Approval. Issue 3 (4th May 2018)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Webb, Clayton
• Is Part Of: International interactions. Volume 44:Issue 3(2018)
• Page Start: 491
• Page End: 509
• Publication Date: 2018-05-04
• Subjects: Economic sanctions -- foreign policy -- presidential approval -- time series analysis; International relations -- Research -- Periodicals; 327
• DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2018.1388234
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0305-0629

Abstract

ABSTRACT: How do economic sanctions affect presidential approval? Competing claims have been made about the domestic political consequences of economic sanctions. One claim is that sanctions are unpopular because they have negative economic consequences; another claim is that sanctions are popular because they project an image of strength; and another claim is that sanctions are neither popular nor unpopular because the public is uninformed about international affairs. These arguments imply competing identification restrictions. I test these competing models using a Bayesian Structural Vector Autoregression (B-SVAR) model. The results show that sanctions have a moderate negative effect on presidential approval. I use these findings as a basis for a broader set of auxiliary analyses. Despite received wisdom, sanctions imposed for different reasons against different target states do not produce disparate effects on public opinion. These analyses resolve an important empirical dilemma that weighs on a range of theoretical perspectives in the sanctions literature and highlights fruitful avenues for future research.