Why Externalist Representationalism is a Form of Disjunctivism. (2nd August 2017)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Gow, Laura
• Is Part Of: Ratio. Volume 31:Supplement 1(2018.)
• Page Start: 35
• Page End: 50
• Publication Date: 2017-08-02
• Subjects: Perception -- Perceptual Experience -- Representationalism -- Disjunctivism -- Naïve Realism; Philosophy -- Periodicals; Analysis (Philosophy) -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1111/rati.12175
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0034-0006

Abstract

Abstract: Externalist representationalism is touted as a superior rival to naïve realism, and yet a careful analysis of the externalist representationalist's analysis of our ordinary perceptual experiences shows the view to be far closer to naïve realism than we might have expected. One of the central advertised benefits of representationalist views in general is that they are compatible with the idea that ordinary, illusory and hallucinatory perceptual experiences are of the same fundamental kind. Naïve realists are forced to deny the 'common fundamental kind claim' and adopt disjunctivism. However, I argue that externalist representationalism is also a version of disjunctivism. Consequently, one of the main rivals to naïve realism turns out not to be a rival at all.