Nash equilibria for voter models with randomly perceived positions. Issue 1 (2nd January 2018)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Rosenthal, Jeffrey S.
• Is Part Of: Stochastic models. Volume 34:Issue 1(2018)
• Page Start: 98
• Page End: 114
• Publication Date: 2018-01-02
• Subjects: Game theory -- multiple parties -- nash equilibrium -- uncertain position -- voter model; Primary 91A06 -- Secondary 60E15, 91F10; Stochastic processes -- Periodicals; Probabilities -- Periodicals; 519.2
• DOI: 10.1080/15326349.2017.1389285
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1532-6349

Abstract

ABSTRACT: We introduce a voter model in which parties' intended policy positions are perceived by voters with some random uncertainty. We prove that for a total of three parties, under some mild assumptions, this model has a Nash equilibrium in which all three parties attempt to contest the election with the median policy. This contrasts with Duverger's Law, which asserts that only two parties will contest the election at all, consistent with some different voter models.