Re-visiting collaborative behavior in supply networks – structural embeddedness and the influence of contextual changes and sanctions. Issue 2 (March 2018)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Nair, Anand; Blome, Constantin; Choi, Thomas Y.; Lee, Gyusuk
• Is Part Of: Journal of purchasing and supply management. Volume 24:Issue 2(2018)
• Page Start: 135
• Page End: 150
• Publication Date: 2018-03
• Subjects: Supply networks -- Collaboration -- Incentive structure -- Sanctions -- Behavioral experiments -- Panel data analysis; Industrial procurement -- Europe -- Management -- Periodicals; Purchasing -- Europe -- Periodicals; Purchasing -- Europe -- Management -- Periodicals; Materials management -- Europe -- Periodicals; Industrial procurement -- Management; Materials management; Purchasing; Purchasing -- Management; Europe; Periodicals; 658.7205
• DOI: 10.1016/j.pursup.2017.11.006
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1478-4092

Abstract

Abstract: This study considers decision making beyond a dyadic buyer-supplier context to the network context. Decisions made by firms are shaped by behavioral norms within the supply network as perceived by the decision makers. Firms can perceive themselves to be part of a collaborative regime or one in which the potential for non-cooperation is high. Further, the ability to put sanctions on non-cooperating firms could shape the overall behavioral patterns in the network. To gain further insights into these aspects and their interactive effects on firm behavior, our study investigates decision-making in supply network by means of behavioral experiments. By organizing practicing managers in a supply network, the study investigates the role of structural embeddedness, incentive structure, and sanctioning mechanisms on the level of collaboration. The results of this study confirm that while sanctions are detrimental for collaborative behavior in a supply network, they play an important role when the underlying norms of governance of such a network are perturbed. The results show that structural embeddedness provides a context that aids adaptive collaborative behavior by firms that are part of the supply network. Once the incentive structure is altered such that there is a higher payoff from defection, the adaptive collaborative behavior is replaced by a behavior in which firms try to maximize their returns and forego collaborative decision-making behavior. Highlights: We study the collaborative behavior in structurally embedded supply networks. In general, Sanctions reduce the level of collaboration in supply networks. But if there is a higher payoff for defection, firms show non-cooperative behaviors. Thus, sanctions become necessary when the incentive structure rewards defection.