Climate change, conflict, and cooperation: Global analysis of the effectiveness of international river treaties in addressing water variability. (March 2015)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Dinar, Shlomi; Katz, David; De Stefano, Lucia; Blankespoor, Brian
• Is Part Of: Political geography. Volume 45(2015:Mar.)
• Page Start: 55
• Page End: 66
• Publication Date: 2015-03
• Subjects: Water variability -- Climate change -- International water treaties -- Water allocation mechanisms -- Institutional mechanisms -- Conflict -- Cooperation -- Treaty effectiveness; Political geography -- Periodicals; Géographie politique -- Périodiques; 320.12
• DOI: 10.1016/j.polgeo.2014.08.003
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0962-6298

Abstract

Abstract: Climate-driven water variability is a natural phenomenon that is observed across river basins, but one that is predicted to increase due to climate change. Environmental change of this kind may aggravate political tensions, especially in regions which are not equipped with an appropriate institutional apparatus. Increased variability is also likely to challenge regions with existing institutional capacity. We argue that our best attempts to assess the ability of states to deal with variability in the future rest with considering how agreements have fared in the past. In this paper, we explore treaty effectiveness, or treaty resilience, by investigating whether particular water allocation and institutional mechanisms help mitigate inter-country tensions over shared water. We use water-related events from the Basins at Risk events database as a dependent variable to test particular hypotheses regarding the impact of treaty design on conflict and cooperation over time. A broad set of climatic, geographic, political, and economic variables are used as controls. The analysis is conducted for the years 1948–2001 using the country dyad as the level of observation. Findings pertaining to our primary explanatory variables suggest that country dyads governed by treaties with water allocation mechanisms exhibiting both flexibility and specificity evince more cooperative behavior. Country dyads governed by treaties with a larger sum of institutional mechanisms likewise evince a higher level of cooperation, although certain institutional mechanisms appear to be more important than others. Highlights: Flexible and specific water allocation mechanisms yield increased cooperation. Treaties with more institutional mechanisms evince higher levels of cooperation. Certain institutional mechanisms are more important than others. Climatic, geographic, and particular political/economic factors affect cooperation.