Concluding Early Agreements in the EU: A Double Principal‐Agent Analysis of Trilogue Negotiations*. (24th September 2017)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Delreux, Tom; Laloux, Thomas
• Is Part Of: Journal of common market studies. Volume 56:Number 2(2018)
• Page Start: 300
• Page End: 317
• Publication Date: 2017-09-24
• Subjects: European Parliament -- climate policy -- Council -- Market Stability Reserve -- trilogues -- principal‐agent; European Economic Community countries -- Periodicals; European Union countries -- Periodicals; Periodicals; 382.9142
• DOI: 10.1111/jcms.12633
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0021-9886

Abstract

Abstract: Applying a principal‐agent perspective on trilogue negotiations, this article examines how the rapporteur and the Presidency, as agents of respectively the European Parliament and the Council, are able to reach a deal with their fellow agent while avoiding an involuntary defection among their principals. Despite these intra‐ and inter‐institutional constraints, early agreements can be concluded because agents execute two parallel tasks on behalf of their principals: representing them inter‐institutionally and acting as the deal‐facilitator intra‐institutionally. We identify three ways in which the agents can combine these two acts of delegation and conclude an early agreement: (1) creating a tied‐hand situation for themselves; (2) affecting the intra‐institutional coalition formation by bringing in allies from the other institution; and (3) actively searching for signals from the principals and the fellow agent on the zone of possible agreement. We illustrate these dynamics through a case study of the policy‐making process on the 2015 Decision on the Market Stability Reserve.