Why cognitivism?. Issue 2 (4th March 2018)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Levy, Yair
• Is Part Of: Canadian journal of philosophy. Volume 48:Issue 2(2018)
• Page Start: 223
• Page End: 244
• Publication Date: 2018-03-04
• Subjects: Intention -- cognitivism about intention -- avowals -- practical knowledge; Philosophy -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1080/00455091.2017.1345207
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0045-5091

Abstract

Abstract: Intention Cognitivism – the doctrine that intending to V entails, or even consists in, believing that one will V – is an important position with potentially wide-ranging implications, such as a revisionary understanding of practical reason, and a vindicating explanation of 'Practical Knowledge.' In this paper, I critically examine the standard arguments adduced in support of IC, including arguments from the parity of expression of intention and belief; from the ability to plan around one's intention; and from the explanation provided by the thesis for our knowledge of our intentional acts. I conclude that none of these arguments are compelling, and therefore that no good reason has been given to accept IC.