Distributive Politics in a Multiparty System: The Conditional Cash Transfer Program in Turkey. (August 2014)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Aytaç, S. Erdem
• Is Part Of: Comparative political studies. Volume 47:Number 9(2014:Sep.)
• Page Start: 1211
• Page End: 1237
• Publication Date: 2014-08
• Subjects: distributive politics -- party systems -- Turkey -- Conditional Cash Transfer -- public spending -- elections; Political science -- Periodicals; 320.05
• DOI: 10.1177/0010414013495357
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0010-4140

Abstract

What are the dynamics of distributive politics in a setting of multiparty competition? Existing studies on the allocation of resources across multiple electoral districts focus primarily on a setting of two-party competition and consider only the core versus swing district hypotheses. This framework does not correspond to the actual electoral setting in many countries and ignores valuable information furnished by a context of multiparty competition. Compared with two-party elections, multiparty elections provide more information about the underlying distribution of the ideological preferences of voters in a district; this information could be utilized by the incumbent party to maximize electoral returns. In this article, I argue that a setting of multiparty competition presents incentives to the incumbent party to channel disproportionately more resources to districts with an ideologically close challenger. Systematic evidence from the Conditional Cash Transfer program spending in 878 districts of Turkey from 2005 to 2008 supports this hypothesis.