Before ethics: scientific accounts of action at the turn of the century. (2nd January 2018)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Zielinska, Anna C.
• Is Part Of: Philosophical explorations. Volume 21:Number 1(2018)
• Page Start: 138
• Page End: 159
• Publication Date: 2018-01-02
• Subjects: von Mises -- Kotarbiński -- Slutskii -- Garfinkel -- Parsons -- Bentham -- Mill -- action theory -- praxeology -- economics; Philosophy of mind -- Periodicals; Act (Philosophy) -- Periodicals; 128
• DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2017.1421696
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1386-9795

Abstract

Abstract : This paper traces the intellectual trajectories of the first stand-alone theories of action, understood as both axiologically neutral and quasi-scientific from a methodological point of view. I argue that the rise of action theory of this kind corresponds to a particular moment of dissatisfaction within Western thought, and as such, it tells us far more about the history of philosophy than the subject itself. I conclude by explaining why subsequent failures to provide an acceptable theory of action are not accidental. On the contrary, such failures owe themselves probably to the fact that formulating a theory of action is neither propitious nor useful. Thus, the most valuable lesson we can learn from philosophical desires for a theory of action is that we should take co-action as the starting point in our normative investigations, rather than positing action simpliciter as a problem to solve. That is, instead of postulating a theory of action, we should think of a paradigm shift, whereby we move away from a representational paradigm in philosophy towards a co-actional one.