The autonomy of government agencies in Germany and Norway: explaining variation in management autonomy across countries and agencies. (June 2014)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Bach, Tobias
• Other Names: Maggetti Martino guest-editor.; Verhoest Koen guest-editor.
• Is Part Of: International review of administrative sciences. Volume 80:Number 2(2014:Jun.)
• Page Start: 341
• Page End: 361
• Publication Date: 2014-06
• Subjects: administrative tradition -- agency autonomy -- delegation -- formal structure -- political control -- task characteristics; Public administration -- Periodicals; Comparative government -- Periodicals; 320
• DOI: 10.1177/0020852313514527
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0020-8523

Abstract

Abstract1 : This article reports the results of a comparative analysis of the human resources management (HRM) autonomy of government agencies in Germany and Norway. Whereas the academic literature largely focuses on ministry–agency relations in countries where agencies have been only recently established, these two countries have a long tradition of delegation to agencies outside ministerial departments. However, although sharing a broadly similar administrative tradition, each country differs with regard to the management reform trajectory. This allows an empirical test to be carried out of the effects of management reforms on HRM autonomy, drawing on survey data. The article also discusses the literature on how task characteristics and formal agency structure supposedly affect agency autonomy and puts these claims to an empirical test. The empirical analysis reveals cross-country differences, a somewhat limited effect of task characteristics, and a clear effect of formal structure on de facto HRM autonomy, especially in the German context. Points for practitioners: The article shows that administrative traditions do not determine trajectories and effects of administrative reforms. Although both countries have a public sector dominated by public law and the principle of legality, the article shows that agency managers in Norway report more extensive autonomy for managing their staff. Thus extensive delegation of management autonomy to agencies is possible even in a 'Rechtsstaat' context. Moreover, the article shows that granting agencies extended formal autonomy and the possibility to generate additional income will also contribute to extended management autonomy. Thus, decision-makers may deliberately influence de facto agency autonomy by using different elements of institutional design.