Location of response facilities: a simultaneous game between state and terrorist. (1st January 2011)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Berman, Oded; Gavious, Arieh; Huang, Rongbing
• Is Part Of: International journal of operational research. Volume 10:Number 1(2011)
• Page Start: 102
• Page End: 120
• Publication Date: 2011-01-01
• Subjects: location -- terror -- game theory -- simultaneous game; Operations research -- Periodicals; 003.05
• DOI: 10.1504/IJOR.2011.037265
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1745-7645

Abstract

We study a simultaneous move game with two players: a terrorist and a state where the latter installs facilities that provide support in case of a terrorist attack. While the state installs the facilities such that the metropolitan area attacked is the one that minimises her disutility (i.e. minimises 'loss'), the terrorist, who is not aware of the location of the facilities, attacks one of the metropolitan areas to maximise his utility. An analytic solution for some specific network structure is introduced. Numerically, we solve the problem for a case study of the 20 largest metropolitan areas in the USA.