Are economic liberties basic rights?. (February 2014)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Platz, Jeppe von
• Is Part Of: Politics, philosophy & economics. Volume 13:Number 1(2014:Feb.)
• Page Start: 23
• Page End: 44
• Publication Date: 2014-02
• Subjects: liberalism -- liberty -- rights -- economic liberties -- economic rights -- John Rawls -- John Tomasi -- Samuel Freeman; Social sciences and ethics -- Periodicals; Philosophy and social sciences -- Periodicals; 320.05
• DOI: 10.1177/1470594X13483466
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1470-594X

Abstract

In this essay I discuss a powerful challenge to high-liberalism: the challenge presented by neoclassical liberals that the high-liberal assumptions and values imply that the full range of economic liberties are basic rights. If the claim is true, then the high-liberal road from ideals of democracy and democratic citizenship to left-liberal institutions is blocked. Indeed, in that case the high-liberal is committed to an institutional scheme more along the lines of laissez-faire capitalism than property-owning democracy. To present and discuss this challenge, I let John Rawls represent the high-liberal argument that only a narrow range of economic liberties are basic rights and John Tomasi represent the neoclassical liberal argument that the full range of economic liberties are basic rights. I show that Rawls's argument is inadequate, but also that Tomasi's argument fails. I thus conclude that high-liberalism is in a precarious situation, but is not yet undone by the neoclassical liberal challenge.