Rewarding Dysfunction: Interest Groups and Intended Legislative Failure. Issue 4 (26th May 2017)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Gelman, Jeremy
• Is Part Of: Legislative studies quarterly. Volume 42:Issue 4(2017:Nov.)
• Page Start: 661
• Page End: 692
• Publication Date: 2017-05-26
• Subjects: Legislative bodies -- Periodicals; Parlement; Procédure législative; Système parlementaire; Étude comparée (Descripteur de forme); Périodique électronique (Descripteur de forme); Ressource Internet (Descripteur de forme); 328
• DOI: 10.1111/lsq.12173
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0362-9805

Abstract

Abstract : Why do majority parties choose to add extreme dead on arrival bills to their legislative agendas rather than enactable legislation? Majorities in Congress choose this strategy in order to accrue political support from their allied interest groups who reliably reward this legislative behavior. By examining all bills that receive floor consideration from 2003 through 2012, as well as interest group scorecards and campaign commercials, I find support for my theory. Dead‐on‐arrival bills generate electoral benefits for majority‐party lawmakers, are more politically valuable than other bills, and are more often used to credit rather than punish legislators.