Corruption crime and punishment: evidence from China's state corruption audits. Issue 4 (2nd October 2017)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Liu, Guangyou; Liu, Siyu
• Is Part Of: Journal of financial crime. Volume 24:Issue 4(2017)
• Page Start: 601
• Page End: 619
• Publication Date: 2017-10-02
• Subjects: Corruption -- Anti-corruption campaign -- State audit; Commercial crimes -- Periodicals; Commercial crimes -- Prevention -- Periodicals; Fraud -- Prevention -- Periodicals; Fraud -- Periodicals; White collar crimes -- Periodicals; 364.168
• DOI: 10.1108/JFC-06-2016-0044
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1359-0790

Abstract

Abstract : Purpose: This paper aims to answer the following two research questions: Do corruption cases present different features before and since the new administration in China? How are criminal penalties affected by these corruption features? Design/methodology/approach: The investigation is based on the online disclosure of 269 state corruption audits and their consequences, which have been made public by China's National Audit Office since 2011. By manual coding, these official reports were analyzed, and an appropriate-sized sample of corruption cases was chosen. The authors then adopted Welch's t -test and regression model methods to test the research hypotheses relevant to the two research questions. Findings: The authors find that larger embezzlement or bribery amounts and more organizational corruption cases have been detected and punished since the anti-corruption campaign was launched by the new administration. They also conclude that significantly tougher criminal penalties were given to corruption cases involving large monetary amounts, that bribery cases were more harshly punished compared to other occupational crimes and that individual perpetrators received tougher criminal penalties than organizational criminals. In addition, the authors observe a trend that criminal penalties for corruption have been increasingly harsher in recent years. Research limitations/implications: The limitations of this study are quite clear as the Chinese corruption cases in this sample only include state corruption audit cases and does not refer to high-profile corruption cases investigated by the Central Commission of Discipline Inspection. However, this study suggests that state corruption audit results are a good research sample, which can be used to extend empirical tests to archival data acquired from state audit practices and can encourage more studies on public sector auditing and occupational financial crime. Practical implications: State corruption audits can be an effective approach to successful anti-corruption campaigns, and the conclusions can be useful to policy makers and legislators in China and other developing countries. Originality/value: This paper bridges some gaps in the existing financial crime literature. First, this study on corruption features is located within the context of a political administrative change; second, the state audit is highlighted as a supervising agency in the anti-corruption campaign; and third, the authors' contribution adds to the empirical testing of data sets of state corruption audits within the existing financial crime literature.