Ambivalence for Cognitivists: A Lesson from Chrysippus?. (21st April 2017)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Wringe, Bill
• Is Part Of: Thought. Volume 6:Number 3(2017:Sep.)
• Page Start: 147
• Page End: 156
• Publication Date: 2017-04-21
• Subjects: emotion -- cognitivism -- ambivalence -- neo‐stoicism -- phenomenology; Philosophy -- Periodicals; Logic -- Periodicals; Knowledge, Theory of -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1002/tht3.243
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 2161-2234

Abstract

Abstract: Ambivalence—where we experience two conflicting emotional responses to the same object, person or state of affairs—is sometimes thought to pose a problem for cognitive theories of emotion. Drawing on the ideas of the Stoic Chrysippus, I argue that a cognitivist can account for ambivalence without retreating from the view that emotions involve fully‐fledged evaluative judgments. It is central to the account I offer that emotions involve two kinds of judgment: one about the object of emotion, and one about the subject's response.